Abstract-Online Social Networks (OSNs) are becoming immensely popular nowadays, and they change the ways people think and live. In this paper, we propose a novel reputation system which allows users to find potential connections between unfamiliar people based on the most updated friend list of each user in OSNs. To some extent, our scheme provides a way to judge people in OSNs without real interactions, but based on the existing overall attitudes on particular people. Moreover, our scheme can protect the confidentially of the potential relationships in which no one is able to acquire the detailed connections between two end nodes. Contrary to those which publish each individual's reputation online, we treat the reputation value in our system as a private issue that has been carefully guaranteed.
I. INTRODUCTION Online Social Networks (OSNs) [1] such as Facebook and Twitter enable people to communicate with other people or to share their own profiles on their web pages. People can use any wired or wireless devices to obtain the OSNs' services, and they are also happy to remotely chat with their friends, and share images and video clips with each other. One of the interesting functionality of OSNs is the reputation system which provides a way to evaluate a particular party in the OSNs, such as a merchant, a company, or even one person. Furthermore, the reputation system has been prevalent implemented due to its intuitive explanation which directly reflects the level of QoS (Quality of Service) or the degree of trust. We also observe thousands of hundreds of people complain about the leaking privacy information from such kinds of OSNs, especially on several commercial OSNs, like eBay. However, one particular user's attitude towards a merchant, which forms the reputation to that merchant, should be well protected, but it can be easily obtained from the website nowadays. On the other hand, due to the inherit nature of OSNs, people are allowed to view friends' information and friend list as well as they are checking their local storage, and also that kind of information has been leaked to the service providers as well. Also, existing OSNs providers do not well protect the relationship information, which yields severe problems along with the careless protection of each individual's attitude particularly in e-commerce environment. Therefore, there is an urgent need to prevent relationship and reputation information breaches while maintaining the original functionality of existing OSNs.
Related Works: A thorough survey [2] on the reputation system for online service provision describes the current trends and development in this area. There are various way to define the reputation or trust value in literature [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Our scheme does not focus on the definition and the derivation of the reputation value, instead, we are along the line of securely transmitting and collecting the value. In spite of various model of trust or reputation, several papers discuss the implementation of trust model on different types of networks, which, to some extent, further develop this area. For example, Xiong. et al. in [8] design a reputation-based trust supporting framework to help estimate the trustworthiness of peers in P2P online community. Srinivasan. et al. give the brief summary of reputation system in the ad hoc and sensor networks [9] . On the other hand, Guha. et al. [10] firstly incorporate the trust and distrust in a computational trust propagation setting, which formulates the transitivity of the trust propagation, and our work is based on part of their work. In [11] , Zhang. et al. first-time define a formal framework to formalize the trust-based routing protocols by using routing algebra in WANETs, which also considers the problem of transitivity of trust. The results show the possibility of implementing the reputation system in OSNs, and all of these papers indicate the promising future of trust or reputation systems.
Our Contributions: In this paper, we mainly focus on discovering the potential connections between two strangers based on the reputation value from one user to another. We first define the reputation path on two arbitrary users, which extend the reputation system in existing OSNs to a multi-hop scenario. Although our scheme is based on each user's friend list, we do not leak any friend information during the protocol run. Furthermore, our scheme leverage the structured encryption to satisfy both the anonymity and confidentiality for the existing relationships and corresponding reputations, all of which are perfectly hidden from the service providers.
II. PRELIMINARY AND SYSTEM MODEL A. Preliminary 1) Bilinear Pairings: Bilinear pairing operations are performed on elliptic curves [12] . Let G 1 and G 2 be an additive group and a multiplicative group, respectively, of the same prime order q. Discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is assumed to be hard in both G 1 and G 2 . Let P denote a random generator of G 1 and e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 denote a bilinear map constructed by modified Weil or Tate pairing with the following properties:
2) Non-degenerate: ∃P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1. 3) Computable: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q), ∀P, Q ∈ G 1 . Pairings are the basic operations in the identity-based cryptosystem used as the authentication backbone in our scheme.
2) Proxy Re-Encryption: Proxy Re-encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive which allows a proxy to convert the existing ciphertext encrypted with Alice's public or secret key into another one that can be decrypt by Bob's private or secret key without learning the detail about the underlying plaintext. PRE has two classifications, one is asymmetric re-encryption where given the proxy re-encryption key, it can translate the ciphertext under public key pk a into that under another public key pk b , and vise versa; on the other hand, we apply the symmetric reencryption scheme in our system, where apart from transforming ciphertext using public keys, we re-encrypt the message by using another domain's secret key which satisfies both the efficiency and security requirements for revoking users in OSNs.
B. Definitions and Assumptions
We further define several entities and terminologies that we use in our proposed system. Besides, we also make assumptions for the behaviors of entities and the underlying scheme.
1) Private Key Generator: It is responsible for system setup and distributing public/private key pairs to the users in the system. P KG will work offline unless there is a new user needed to be granted the access right.
2) Central Storage: We define a central storage (CS) for storing the reputation relationships. CS will respond to the query for neighbor information and updating the data storage. However, we assume that the CS will not be responsible for storing the reputation values, which is the same as the pervasive social networking sites nowadays, e.g., Facebook, Twitter and so on. For security concerns, we would not allow the users to upload information in the plaintext form onto the CS; on the contrary, we apply the cryptographic primitives to store both the social relationship and node information in ciphertext form.
3) Reputation Value: We define the reputation value as asymmetric numeric value with r ∈ [0, 1] between two users, where 0 denotes lowest reputation level which may destroy the whole reputation path, 1 represents the highest level with full trust, respectively. Also, we assume that the reputation value is transitive, and the value of multiple path is the product of hop value. Furthermore, the asymmetric value means the directional reputation values can be different according to different trust levels. We also assume that the reputation value towards other users is a private issue to each user, where users along the reputation path should not be aware of the reputation value to themselves, meanwhile, they cannot tell the reputation value to a specific user one hop further from him. We need to clarify that we cannot monitor the change of one node's reputation value towards others. More specifically, it is his right to arbitrarily change his "ratings" to others in the sense that we cannot treat this as a misbehavior.
4) Anonymity:
In our scheme, the reputation path should be discovered and maintained confidentially to every user in the system, also hidden from the CS. Furthermore, the reputation value along with the path should be kept anonymously and confidentially from other users who only act as "relay" nodes in the social networks, in the sense that an intermediate node would learn nothing concerning both the ancestor and successor nodes one hop away from it. We cannot perform the anonymity to one's friends in our scheme, since there are many means to trace back to the sender of a packet, i.e. IP address. Therefore, we only provide the scheme which offers the anonymity to the intermediate nodes along one path to the nodes that at least one hop further from them.
C. Security Objectives
The main security objective of our proposed scheme is to guarantee the privacy in the friend search during the reputation path discovery. Users' privacy includes the anonymous reputation value towards other interacted users and hiding the reputation path from all intermediate users. Anonymous reputation value requires that no intermediate user can tell the reputation value to his/her non-interactive users. Hiding reputation path implies that every nodes along the reputation path cannot obtain the routing table of the whole path. The users' privacy requirement should be fulfilled regardless of access rights of entities.
D. Adversary Model
The adversary model defines the attackers and their possible attacks on our proposed scheme. The predefined CS is a semitrusted authority which is curious but honest. It will work online for the response of launched queries, but will not launch the malicious attacks (e.g., denial-of-service attack). CS will store the relationship information of the underlying users in the system as a whole. We allow the CS to eagerly acquire the information for every query. The users in the social networks will tend to acquire the reputation value not only to themselves, but also between arbitrary two users. Gaining such values will help them to intentionally build a reputation path based on their willings, which may make the final reputation value subjective and invalid. Malicious users in the system will attempt to be someone that have directly interaction with the target user, in which they will pretend to be the most trustful user compared to any other users but actually they may even have no connections at all, so that more reputation paths would be directly built from these attackers, which makes the system untrustworthy. Also, passive eavesdroppers will attempt to intercept the transmitted packets on the fly. We exclude the collusion attacks in our scheme.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN

A. Main Idea
We assume our scheme as a relatively stable system in which users maintains a relatively stable reputation values. Based on the careful observation on the pervasive existing OSNs, the central server will keep the record of friend list and allow people to update at any given time. Similarly, our reputation path discovery scheme is run recursively, in which each node will update his/her friend list to the CS continuously. We first apply the structured encryption [13] together with the proxy reencryption for both the query of neighbor nodes in an encrypted manner and update friend list without disclosing the detail to the server. Apart from these operations, we also design the new user grant and user revocation in an efficient and secure mean. Our scheme not only implements the discovering process based on the friendship, but also leverages the corresponding reputations during the searching procedure. Each user will keep a star-like structure which maintains his relationships with the center and his friends (along with the updated indirected friends) involving the factor of reputation. When there is a request in search of a particular node, one will check his structure to discover that node. If it is involved in the structure, the request packet will be processed and passed along the reputation path. Thus, we hide the detail of the specific path, in the sense that every intermediate node only knows the next hop and the final destination, which provides the path anonymity and confidentiality.
B. Reputation Path Discovery
We use Fig. 1 as an example to illustrate our proposed scheme. In this figure, S node denotes the source node who will initiate the reputation transmission, while D node is the destination in which S is looking for. Note that S and D have no direct relationship stored in the CS. Other nodes are the potential nodes which would build up the reputation path when the transmission procedure is initiated. The red solid line represents the distribution of token, while the blue solid line denotes the query by using the previous required token. After CS process the query, it will return a set of nodes to whom is launched the request. Then, the node which launched the request will update a new set of nodes as the green dash line shows. 1) System Setup: In our scheme, we apply the ID-based cryptographic technique for securing the reputation value transmission. In the system setup, the P KG will assign the IDbased public/private key pairs for each node in the system, and then P KG will go offline as we have assumed before. The key generation procedures are as follows [12] :
1. Input the security parameter ξ to the system and output a parameter tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 , e, P, H). 2. Randomly select a domain master secret ς ∈ Z * q and calculate the domain public key as P pub = ςP . The P KG publishes the domain parameters tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 , e, P, H, P pub ) and maintain ς confidential, where H(·) is defined before as H(·) : {0, 1} * → G 1 , and P is a generator of G 1 . Given a specific public ID ∈ {0, 1} l , the public/private key (pk ID /sk ID ) pair is H(ID)/ς · H(ID), which are distributed by the P KG during the initiation process. Each node will keep the private key secretly.
2) Data Uploading and Data Query: Now, we will introduce the basic uploading data scheme without exposing the data file in plaintext form, in which we call it anonymous storing. We utilize part of the structured encryption scheme proposed by Chase and Kamara in [13] .
Initiation:
process is operated by each possible device in the social network (laptop, PC, or a mobile device). We select two pseudorandom functions F and G, and a semantic secure symmetric key encryption E, and the key for the following scheme are α, β and κ, respectively:
where v ∈ V is the ID of vertex (node) in graph G : (V, E), and L(v i ) denotes the label associated to each node of the set
Note that all the nodes (given the label L(v i )) can be seen as starting from the node v i , all of which form a star-like structure. Based on the ID-based cryptosystem, we can also encrypt a message by using a symmetric key and the receiver can derive his symmetric key based on his local computation. Here, we assume K C1,C0 , and K C0,C1 represent symmetric keys generated by C 0 and C 1 , respectively:
C 0 will transmit the symmetric key to its neighbors to decrypt the message obtained from CS as follows,
where t 1 is the timestamp designed to prevent reply attack and HM AC is key hash message authentication code used for checking and verifying the integrity of the encrypted value. C 1 can acquire the decryption key for the packet generated by C 0 . Encryption: As we described before, we not only encrypt the data items on the node side, but also encrypt the data structure and stored in the CS. The data structure hidden from the server will disclose the corresponding nodes who have the authority to decrypt both the structure and the data file. We propose a efficient threshold structured encryption scheme which supports both data and user update.
We first define a random permutation π : (c π(ı) ), where the D denotes the decryption process opposite to E.
The encryption scheme includes two main parts: one is to encrypt the structure of the data items, the other is to encrypt the corresponding data set. In our scheme, nodes will upload a set of nodes undisclosed with a certain threshold, e.g., C 0 defines a threshold for his uploading policy in which δ C0 = 0.6, which means C 0 will store his neighbor nodes associated the reputation value greater than δ C0 . We use term δ C0 (L(C 0 )) to denotes the set of nodes in L C0 that satisfy the requirement of reputation. Furthermore, this implies that any query based on token issued by C 0 will return the set of nodes with C 0 's reputation value greater than 0.6. The proposed encryption is as follows, also taking C 0 as an example:
1. C 0 chooses a unique random permutation
2. Compute the pseudo-random function by given key tuple β, let kw :
onto the server with the search key kw, all of which form a encrypted structure T . 4. Permute m ı → m j , where j ← π C0 (ı). For 1 j n, let c j = E κ (m j ). Thus, the server will store a structure T and a set of corresponding ciphertext c. We need to note that the entries stored in the server include all the encrypted pointers which concatenate with each other to XOR with F α (C 0 ), such that the maximum length of the results of F would be max(L) · log n. If there are not enough bits, we need to pad dummy bits to satisfy the length.
Decryption: Node C 0 will issue the query token to each of his friends whom C 0 consider it is certain, in the sense C 0 has the flexibility to choose whom to upload and issue the token. Decryption procedure is as follows, 1. Token issue: C 0 issues the token τ :
to C 1 and a certain set of nodes. 2. Search: C 1 would be able to search by utilizing the token kw = G β (C 0 ), and compute XOR for F α (C 0 ) and the given entry. If the given token is not in T , then output ⊥; otherwise, the search result would be the pointers set J = (j 1 , ..., j n ). 3. J points to the ciphertext which satisfies the token requirements and C 0 's threshold. C 1 uses his symmetric key κ to decrypt the set of ciphertext that J points to, where m j = D κ (c j ), 1 j n. 3) Data and User Update: Our scheme requires each node in the system updates its own friend list recursively, which is used for the discovery of the reputation path. We also assume that the update process is run during the operation of the system. Data Update: Data update is for the purpose of adding indirect friends to both nodes themselves and central storage. Taking C 1 as an example, first, it needs to update its own local path structure; second, it has to check whether the new updated node satisfy its own policy, e.g., if the C 0 upload the nodes with its reputation value greater than δ C0 = 0.6, δ C1 = 0.5 and r(C 1 , C 0 ) = 0.7, C 1 needs to verify whether the node set obtained from C 0 satisfies δ C1 ; finally, C 1 rearranges its node set and updates to the server. We assume that every node will know its friends' threshold, e.g., C 1 will notice that δ C0 = 0.6. Thus, in this case, the reputation value range that C 1 towards C 0 's uploaded nodes is between 0.42 and 0.7. Broadly speaking, there might have three possible conditions in large if comparing the own threshold and received reputation range,
where Φ denotes uploading nothing to the server and S is the subset of the whole set of the node C 0 uploaded to the server S δC 0 Ω . C 1 will upload the set of nodes to the server correspondingly according to their satisfaction toward the given reputation range. Now, we consider the most complicated condition where δ C1 is between that two given values. However, as for C 1 , it has little knowledge concerning which one or at most three of the received nodes are below its threshold. We design a negotiation process to handle this problem, which still achieves the security requirement for the system and we will discuss in later section. The negotiation process is as follows,
HM AC(Rsp||t 3 ||E KC 0 ,C 1 (S)). where Ngt and Rsp denote that the packets' purpose are for the negotiation of the uploaded nodes and response for that negotiation, respectively. Note that C 1 will transmit a quotient of δC 1 r(C1,C0) without disclosing the detail of the two values. After C 0 receives these packets from one of its friends, it will process and return the nodes S ⊆ S Ω with its reputation values greater than that required quotient. Thus, C 1 can upload this set of nodes to the server which satisfy its own threshold δ C1 .
We divide the data update process into two phases. The first phase is to rearrange the data sets and the following is to secure update file in the server along with the keyword. We first show the data rearrangement procedure in the local storage of C 1 as shown in Fig.2 . Note that we exclude the node F because the C 0 deletes that node in response of C 1 's negotiation request. If every node in the system uploads the corresponding nodes as above, it will hide the detail of the path from the node who asks for the token. If C 1 uploads this set of nodes as above, the node who requests the friend list from C 1 will know it can reach D via C 1 without knowing the detail who "relay" the packet to D. During the phase of uploading updated data, C 1 needs to define a new random permutation π C1 and re-encrypt the message by using the original key κ C1 . Then, C 1 needs to replace the original entry of the keyword with the new one (π C 1 (ı) ı∈δC 1 (L(C1)) ) ⊕ F αC 1 (C 1 ) without changing the token τ C1 := (F αC 1 (C 1 ), G βC 1 (C 1 )) and also the kw C1 . Thus, the friends of C 1 can obtain the new set of friends by querying to the server by using the original token and decryption key, which saves the communication burden between C 1 and its friends.
User Update: We design the user update as part of our scheme to leverage the issue of new users grant and revocation of misbehaved users. We define the user who uploads data in terms of Data Owner. Compare to user revocation, the operation of new user grant is relatively simple and efficient. Since our scheme implement semantical symmetric key encryption for the nodes around data owner, it can directly issue the secret key κ and token to the new user if it satisfy the requirement of token policy (which is set by data owner). However, if the new user also needs to be updated to the server for other neighbors' search, the data owner can follow the algorithm of data updating to enlist that new user as well.
User revocation involves the key update and data re-encryption. Traditional ways incur extra computation and communication costs to the data owner. Since our scheme is based on the symmetric key encryption from end to the server, we only need upload newly re-encrypted data to the server and distribute the new symmetric key to the neighbors without including revoked users, which prevents the revoked users from decrypting the ciphertext using an original key. Thus, we propose to use proxy re-encryption scheme based on the assumption that CS is honest and will not launch malicious attacks (e.g., Denial of Service). Comparing to data update which has little effort on saving the communication costs but to re-upload one's friend list, or the search process will be messed up, the user revocation process needs to decrease the computation efforts on the user side. Taking C 0 as an example, E is qualified to acquire the friend list from C 0 , although E is not on C 0 's uploaded friend list. C 0 may find that E behave badly which largely decreases C 0 's reputation value and E is not able to query the friend list, so C 0 wants to revoke that user from obtaining the friend list. The process is as follows,
where SK ρ C0 represents the proxy re-encryption key that is used to encrypt the ciphertext, and E(·) denotes encryption function between CS and corresponding nodes. Here we clarify the different sets of nodes related to data owner, where S is a subset of v i 's uploaded nodes S δv i Ω and S Ω (v i ) denotes all the possible nodes that are given the token to query for the data. Apparently, S δv i Ω ⊆ S Ω (v i ) denotes data owner will issue the token to the nodes which have been already uploaded to the server; on the other hand, it is the data owner's flexibility to choose to give the set S ⊂ S δv i Ω but S ⊂ S Ω (v i ) the token. Specifically speaking, the user revocation process happen when the above condition holds. If a node has already uploaded and needs to be revoked, the data update and user revocation process should be operated accordingly. More generally, the policies based on different nodes will vary greatly, and we need to have fine-grained access control towards them.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We briefly discuss the security objectives that our proposed scheme has achieved. Our scheme preserves the data confidentially in both the friend list query and anonymous reputation transmission processes, because our encryption schemes that used in uploading encrypted data, data queries and reputation value encryption are CPA-secure. To some extent, the ciphertexts which the scheme outputs do not reveal any partial information about the corresponding plaintexts even to an adversary who can adaptively query an encryption oracle. Another possible attack concerning data confidentiality is launched by attackers who intercept the packets transmission on the fly. However, all the encryption schemes we used during the transmission between two nodes are based on the assumption that Bilinear DiffieHellman Problem is hard. Our scheme also satisfies the security requirements of authentication and access control since nodes need to bilaterally verify each other by using each other's key pair to derive the symmetric keys. On the aspect of preserving the anonymous path, our scheme will not disclose the path information to any party in the system, since each node only keeps its next node as the records and uploads indirect nodes to the CS without exposing detailed paths. As a result, nodes cannot tell the previous and following nodes one hop away from them which perfectly protects anonymous reputation paths.
V. CONCLUSION In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving reputation scheme for online social networks, which securely find a reputation path between a pair of unknown nodes based on the periodically updated friend list of each intermediate nodes and corresponding reputation value. Our scheme implements structured encryption with data update to form the reputation path, meanwhile, it perfectly hide the detail routing information from the intermediate nodes along one path. Also, we treat one's reputation value on other nodes as a privacy issue which has been carefully treated and our scheme can let the intermediate nodes pass the reputation value without disclosing each hop's values. We also leave the derivation of the reputation value on the designated reputation path as an open problem which will be discussed in our full version paper.
